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This paper estimates the structural parameters of a job search model with hyperbolic
discounting and endogenous search eﬀort. It estimates quantitatively the degree of hyper-
bolic discounting, and assesses its implications for the impact of various policy interventions
aimed at reducing unemployment. The model is estimated using data on unemployment
spells and accepted wages from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The
likelihood function explicitly incorporates all the restrictions implied by the optimal dy-
namic programming solution to the model. Both observed and unobserved heterogeneity
are accounted for. The results point to a substantial degree of hyperbolic discounting,
especially for low and medium wage workers. The structural estimates are also used to
evaluate alternative policy interventions for the unemployed. Estimates based on a model
with exponential discounting may lead to biased inference on the economic impact of poli-
cies.
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are my own.1. Introduction
Job search is an unpleasant activity with immediate costs and delayed beneﬁts. The tension
between long-run goals and short-run impulses may lead unemployed workers to postpone
repeatedly tasks necessary to ﬁnd a job. In standard economic models, agents are assumed
to be time-consistent, so that a contrast between short-run and long-run preferences never
arises. However, a growing literature has challenged the conventional view, and allows agents
to be time inconsistent by modeling their discount function as hyperbolic (as opposed to the
standard assumption of exponential discounting).1 Agents with hyperbolic discount functions
exhibit a high degree of discounting in the short run, but a relatively low degree of discounting
in the long run. Therefore, hyperbolic agents are likely to delay tasks with immediate costs
and delayed beneﬁts, whereas they would choose to perform the same task if both costs and
beneﬁts were to occur in the future.
Hyperbolic preferences may aﬀect the way we think of job search problems, and of policies ad-
dressing unemployment. First, we must recognize that agents with hyperbolic and exponential
preferences will give diﬀerent weights to the various components of costs and beneﬁts involved
in the search process: hyperbolic agents will be particularly sensitive to the immediate and
direct costs of search (writing the résumé, contacting employers, making unpleasant phone
calls to distant relatives), while impatient exponential agents are more likely to be aﬀected by
long-run costs and beneﬁts, such as those associated with waiting longer to obtain a better job.
Hence, policies that are targeted at one particular dimension of the job search process may be
more eﬀective for one type of worker than for the other. Secondly, the welfare implications
of unemployment policies may diﬀer substantially depending on the type of preferences. In
a model with conventional preferences, an agent may experience a long unemployment spell
because of bad luck. With hyperbolic preferences, a long unemployment spell could be due
to “bad” choices, with the agent agreeing that his own choices are undesirable from a long-
run perspective. Therefore, an intervention that brings the agent to choose actions more in
line with his long-run preferences may actually be welfare improving, despite its imposition of
restrictions, potentially even highly unpleasant ones, on the unemployed.
In order to assess the eﬀects of policies, we need to estimate the degree of hyperbolic discount-
ing. Despite the recent uspurge of interest in time-inconsistent preferences, direct estimates of
the parameters of the discount function are relatively rare.2 Knowledge of these parameters has
important implications not only for the speciﬁc environment studied in this paper (job search
1See Laibson (1997); O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999); Harris and Laibson (2001).
2Exceptions include Angeletos et al. (2001), and Fang and Silverman (2002).
1and unemployment spells), but also for the multitude of other applications in which hyperbolic
preferences have been used, from retirement savings (Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman, 1998
and 2003; Diamond and K˝ oszegi, 2003) to the consumption of addictive goods (Gruber and
K˝ oszegi, 2001).
In this paper, I provide one of the ﬁrst structural estimates of the degree of hyperbolic discount-
ing. I set up a model of job search with endogenous search eﬀort and hyperbolic discounting,
similar to the one used in DellaVigna and Paserman (2000 henceforth DV-P). I set up a likeli-
hood function that explicitly incorporates all the restrictions implied by the optimal dynamic
programming solution to the model. The model is estimated using data on unemployment
spells and accepted wages from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). I control
for observed heterogeneity in the worker’s wages before the unemployment spell, in cognitive
test scores, in marital status, and in race. Unobserved heterogeneity enters the model as a
ﬁnite mixture distribution, whose parameters need to be estimated.
A key question that arises in empirical studies on hyperbolic preferences is that of identiﬁca-
tion. In many settings, the behavior of agents with hyperbolic preferences is observationally
equivalent to that of agents with conventional preferences but a high degree of impatience.
The distinguishing feature of the model presented here is that diﬀerent forms of impatience
have contrasting eﬀects on the outcomes of the job search process. In DV-P we showed that
impatience lowers the probability of receiving a job oﬀer, but raises the probability of accepting
the oﬀer. For hyperbolic workers, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, so that, ceteris paribus, workers
with a higher degree of short-run impatience experience longer spells of unemployment. On
the other hand, if individuals only diﬀer in their exponential discount rate, the second eﬀect
in general dominates: more impatient exponential workers have shorter unemployment spells.
The intuition behind the main result in DV-P helps to illustrate how the short-run and the long-
run discounting parameters are separately identiﬁed with data on the length of unemployment
spells and accepted wages. The search process is made up of two separate decisions: the search
eﬀort decision involves a trade-oﬀ between immediate costs and beneﬁts that will be realized
in the near future, once an oﬀer is accepted. In the United States, this time span is typically
no longer than 30 weeks. Over this limited time horizon, short-run impatience matters the
most. The reservation wage decision, on the other hand, essentially involves only a comparison
between payoﬀs in the more distant future. To a ﬁrst approximation, the degree of short-run
discounting has no eﬀect on the reservation wage.3 Then, assuming that all the other model
3The statement is exactly true if agents are naive and there is a one period delay between the time a job
oﬀer is accepted and the time of the ﬁrst wage payment. See DV-P, Proposition 1(c).
2parameters are known, one can back out the long-term discount factor from the estimated
reservation wage. The short term discount factor is then identiﬁed from data on exit rates
from unemployment.
The results of the structural estimation point to a substantial degree of present bias for low
and medium wage workers, and only a moderate degree of short run impatience for high wage
workers. I use the maximum likelihood estimates to evaluate alternative policy interventions
for the unemployed. The policies analyzed are a cut in unemployment beneﬁts, a job search
assistance program, monitoring search eﬀort, monitoring the job acceptance strategy, and a
re-employment bonus. I ﬁnd that ignoring hyperbolic preferences may lead one to incorrect
inferences on the eﬀects of these interventions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, after a brief summary of hyperbolic
discounting, I describe the model and the main features of its solution. In Section 3 I describe
how to estimate the structural parameters of the model. I set up the likelihood function, specify
functional forms, and discuss identiﬁcation issues. In Section 4 I present and discuss the results
of the maximum likelihood estimation. I also analyze the robustness of the results to diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of the heterogeneity distribution, and investigate the predictions generated by
the diﬀerent speciﬁcations with respect to several outcomes of interest, both in terms of the
outcomes’ expected values ex-ante, and in terms of their dynamic evolution over the course of




Over the years, psychologists have collected a substantial body of evidence on individual time
preferences (for a review, see Ainslie, 1992). Experiments show that agents are extremely
impatient if the rewards are to be obtained in the near future, but relatively patient when
choosing between rewards to be accrued in the distant future. This form of discounting implies
that agents prefer a larger, later reward over a smaller, earlier one as long as the rewards
are suﬃciently distant in time; however, as both rewards get closer in time, the agent may
choose the smaller, earlier reward. In an experiment with monetary rewards an overwhelming
majority of subjects exhibit such reversal of preferences (Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995).
Hyperbolic discount functions, introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and ﬁrst studied in
3the context of intertemporal one-person decisions by Laibson (1997), provide a convenient
representation of the above ﬁndings: for a decision maker at any time s, the discount function
is equal to 1 for t = s and to βδt−s for t = s+1,s+2,...,w i t hβ < 1. The implied discount factor
from period s to the next period is βδ, while the discount factor between any two periods in
the future is simply δ. However, when period s+1comes along, the agent faces the same type
of preferences: the discount factor between that period and the next is βδ. This matches the
main feature of the experimental evidence – high discounting at short delays, low discounting
at long delays.
These preferences are dynamically inconsistent. To illustrate this, consider a plan of actions qt
that yield instantaneous utility u(qt), for t =0 ,1,2,...,T. From today’s perspective, the plan
from period s o n w a r d sy i e l d su t i l i t y




However, from the perspective of the decision maker at time s, the same plan yields utility




There is therefore a conﬂict between the preferences of a given individual at diﬀerent points in
time. Note that this conﬂict disappears in the special case of β =1 . In this case, we are back
to the time-consistent exponential model with discount function δt.
We can interpret β as the parameter of short-run patience and δ as the parameter of long-run
patience. The degree of short-run patience β is crucial for this theory; any β smaller than
one is suﬃcient to generate some degree of procrastination in activities with salient costs and
delayed beneﬁts, such as searching for a job (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). The implications
of this form of time inconsistency in the context of job search are easy to see. A worker with
a very high degree of short run impatience may wish to postpone her job search activities to a
later period, when, from today’s perspective, the discount rate is relatively low; however, when
the later period comes along, the worker once more faces a high degree of short-run impatience,
and will choose to postpone her activity again.
For the purposes of this paper, we will restrict attention to the case of a sophisticated hyperbolic
worker. A sophisticated agent is aware of her time inconsistency problem: she knows that at
time s in the future, she will choose an action q∗
s that maximizes the utility function in (2.2).
The optimal choice at s depends on the set of actions chosen from today until s−1. Therefore








The sophisticated agent knows that if she postpones a task until tomorrow, she may wish to
postpone it again. She will therefore try to ﬁnd ways to overcome her procrastination problems.
In the context of job search, the sophisticated worker will, assuming that no commitment
devices are available, exert higher eﬀort in the present, knowing that in the future she will
search less than what is optimal from today’s perspective.4
2.2. Setting
The model is a variant of the prototypical job search model (Lippman and McCall, 1976),
augmented to include endogenous search eﬀort and hyperbolic discounting. The model is set
in discrete time; it is convenient to think of a week as the time unit. Consider an inﬁnitely
lived worker who is unemployed at time t. In each period of unemployment, the worker takes
two decisions: ﬁrst, he chooses the amount of search eﬀort; second, conditional on receiving a
job oﬀer, he decides whether to accept it or not.
In every period, the worker receives instantaneous utility bt. Im o d e lbt as the sum of two
components: the ﬁrst component, bUI
t is the monetary value of Unemployment Insurance (UI)
beneﬁts. This may vary during the course of the unemployment spell. The second component,
b0, represents the psychic value of being unemployed: it can be either positive (utility of leisure)
or negative (stigma, low self-esteem, etc.). I assume that b0 is invariant over time.
Search eﬀort st is parameterized as the probability of obtaining a job oﬀer;5 therefore, st ∈ [0,1].
In every period the agent incurs a cost of search c(st), an increasing and strictly convex function
of st. The assumption of increasing marginal cost comes naturally. The marginal cost of
eﬀort is low when the agent is searching little: a meeting with a friend or a glance at the
newspaper raises the probability of ﬁnding a job at minimal additional expense. On the other
hand, increasing the probability of receiving an oﬀer up to almost certainty is likely to have
4A naive worker believes incorrectly that her future preferences will be exponential, and that his procras-
tination problems are only temporary. In DV-P, we found that the qualitative and quantitative behavior of
sophisticated and naive workers in a job search model is similar.
5Suppose that the worker chooses search eﬀort z, and that a job oﬀer is generated with probability s = p(z).
Under the assumption that p(·) is a strictly increasing function of search, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between s and z. Without loss of generality, we can then specify the worker’s problem more conveniently in
terms of the probability of receiving an oﬀer s.
5prohibitive costs. In order to simplify the characterization of the solution, I also assume no
ﬁxed costs of search: a worker may be informed about an outstanding job oﬀer at no cost.
Upon receiving a job oﬀer, the worker must decide whether to accept it or not. The job oﬀer
is characterized by a wage w, which is a realization of a random variable W with cumulative
distribution function F. If the worker accepts the oﬀer, he becomes employed and receives
wage w starting from next period. We assume F to be known to the worker, constant over
time and independent of search eﬀort. In other words, search eﬀort determines how often the
individual samples out of F, not the distribution being sampled.
Finally, we allow for the possibility of layoﬀ. A tt h ee n do fe a c hp e r i o do fe m p l o y m e n t ,t h e
worker is laid oﬀ with known probability q ∈ [0,1],6 in which case he becomes unemployed
starting from next period. With probability 1 − q, the worker continues to be employed at
wage w.
Summing up, the timing of a period t o fu n e m p l o y m e n ti sa sf o l l o w s :
1. The worker receives bt = bUI
t + b0, the utility associated with unemployment, equal to
the sum of the monetary value of unemployment beneﬁts and a term representing the
psychic value of time when unemployed.
2. The worker decides the amount of search eﬀort st and pays cost of search c(st).
3. With probability st he then receives a job oﬀer w (drawn from F).
4. Finally, contingent on receiving an oﬀer, he accepts it or declines it. If he accepts, he is
employed with wage w starting from period t+1, and faces an exogenous layoﬀ probability
q in every period. If no oﬀer is received or the oﬀer is declined, the worker searches again
in period t +1 .
Note that, while the cost function and the wage distribution function are assumed to be invari-
ant over time, we allow the utility associated with unemployment to be a function of the length
of the unemployment spell. This is meant to reﬂect the common feature of the Unemployment
I n s u r a n c es y s t e m ,w h e r eb e n e ﬁts are paid only for a limited amount of time. The model is
therefore non-stationary: the optimal amount of search eﬀort and the acceptance/rejection
strategy will depend on the current length of the unemployment spell. Finally, we should note
6The assumption of a ﬁx e ds e p a r a t i o np r o b a b i l i t yq is somewhat unrealistic, given the well documented
declining shape of the hazard function for employment spells. However, an attempt to estimate a model with
the separation probability being a declining step function did not yield signiﬁcantly diﬀerent results.
6that the model is set in partial equilibrium and abstracts from any potential response of ﬁrms
to the presence of job seekers with hyperbolic preferences.
2.3. Solution
For any period t, we can write down the maximization problem of the unemployed worker for
given continuation payoﬀ V U
t+1 when unemployed and V E
t+1(w) when employed at wage w.T h e

















where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of wage oﬀers F. Expression
(2.3) is easily interpretable: the worker in period t receives beneﬁts bt and pays the cost of
search c(st). The continuation payoﬀs are discounted by the factor βδ, where β is the additional
term due to hyperbolic discounting (for the exponential worker, β =1 ). With probability st
the worker receives a wage oﬀer w that he can then accept – thus obtaining, starting from
next period, the continuation payoﬀ from employment V E
t+1(w) – or reject, in which case he
gains next period the continuation payoﬀ from unemployment, V U
t+1. With probability 1 − st,
the worker does not ﬁnd a job and therefore receives V U
t+1. The continuation payoﬀ from
employment at wage w, from the perspective of the decision maker in period t,i s
V E(w)=w + δ
h
qV U
new +( 1− q)V E(w)
i
.7
The worker obtains wage w in period t +1 ;then, with probability 1 − q he maintains his job
and continues to receive wage w; with probability q he is laid oﬀ, in which case he enters a
new spell of unemployment whose value is V U
new. The exact speciﬁcation of V U
new is deferred
until later. Note that, from the perspective of self t, payoﬀsf r o mp e r i o dt +1onwards are
discounted exponentially.
To make the model operational, we now assume that, beginning in period T+1, the environment
is stationary. The only environmental variable that we allow to vary over time is bUI
t .O n c e
UI beneﬁts are exhausted, the environment becomes stationary: in every period the worker
chooses the same intensity of search eﬀort and the same acceptance strategy. In DV-P we give a
detailed account of the stationary solution: this includes a proof of existence and uniqueness of
the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in the intrapersonal game played by the hyperbolic
individual’s diﬀerent selves.
7Note that the continuation payoﬀ from employment does not depend on the time one becomes employed.
H e n c ew ec a no m i tt h et i m es u b s c r i p t .
7The equilibrium solution in the stationary model is characterized by a reservation wage policy.
Let w∗
T+1 and sT+1 represent, respectively, the reservation wage and the optimal level of search
eﬀort in the stationary equilibrium. The reservation wage is:
w∗
T+1 =[ 1− δ (1 − q)]V U
T+1 − δqV U
new. (2.4)
The stationary value of being unemployed, V U
T+1, and the optimal level of search eﬀort, sT+1,
can then be found by solving the following system of nonlinear equations:
(1 − δ)V U
T+1 = bT+1 − c(sT+1)+
δsT+1


















x (u − x)dF (u). Having obtained the solution for the stationary problem, it
is straightforward to solve the entire model by backwards induction. The dynamic equations
characterizing the solution in periods t =1 ,...,T are :
w∗
t =[ 1 − δ (1 − q)]V U
t+1 − δqV U
new; (2.7)
V U
t − δV U
t+1 = bt − c(st)+
δst





1 − δ (1 − q)
Q(w∗
t). (2.9)
To obtain a solution to this model, we need to specify V U
new, the value of becoming unemployed
after having been laid oﬀ. Given the features of the Unemployment Insurance system, V U
new
should depend on the accepted wage and on the duration of the employment spell. However,
this would introduce considerable diﬃculties in calculating the solution. Instead, I make the
simplifying assumption that V U
new = V U
T+1. This implies that a worker is no longer eligible to
take UI beneﬁts after his ﬁrst spell of unemployment. While this assumption is unrealistic for
most workers, it is plausible to assume that any bias introduced will not be large.8




1 : in other words, once the worker is laid oﬀ he
starts a new unemployment spell with all parameters taking on the same values as in the current spell. In this
case a state variable is added to the dynamic programming model (V
U
1 ), and the solution involves ﬁnding a













1 . A ﬁxed point did not
always exist for all parameter values; where it was possible to obtain a solution, it did not diﬀer substantially





8Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics for the stationary level of search eﬀort, of reserva-
tion wages, and of the implied exit rate from unemployment as functions of the model parame-
ters. Most of the comparative statics results are familiar from the vast literature on job search
models (see for example Burdett and Ondrich, 1985). A rise in the utility of unemployment
b is associated with lower search eﬀort and higher reservation wages. A location shift in the
wage distribution increases the beneﬁts of search, and therefore leads to higher search eﬀort,
higher reservation wages, and a higher probability of acceptance. A mean preserving spread in
the wage distribution, by raising the probability of drawing a very high wage (whereas a very
low wage can always be rejected), raises search eﬀort and reservation wages, while its eﬀect on
the probability of acceptance is ambiguous. An increase in the probability of layoﬀ lowers the
v a l u eo fac u r r e n tj o bo ﬀer, and therefore also lowers the reservation wage and the intensity of
search. Its eﬀect on the exit rate from unemployment is ambiguous. Finally a multiplicative
increase in the cost function lowers search eﬀort. Since search has become more costly the
worker becomes less selective in his job acceptance policy. The global eﬀect of an increase in
costs on the exit rate is ambiguous.
In DV-P, we highlighted the relationship between the outcomes of the job search process and
the impatience parameters β and δ. Impatience has two contrasting eﬀects on the job search
process. Impatient individuals dislike all sorts of investment activities, and therefore exert
little search eﬀort. On the other hand, once they have a job oﬀer in hand, they prefer to
accept it right away rather than wait an additional period for an even better oﬀer. In other
words, impatience lowers the probability of receiving, but raises the probability of accepting a
job oﬀer. Both impatience parameters in fact operate in the same direction on the intensity of
search eﬀort and on the reservation wage. However, the magnitude of the eﬀects diﬀers sharply:
the short run discounting parameter β operates mainly on the intensity of search eﬀort, while
the long-run discounting parameter δ inﬂuences primarily the reservation wage. As a result,
higher short-run impatience is associated with longer unemployment spells (the search eﬀect
dominates). In DV-P we show that this result requires only a very mild assumption on the
wage distribution, which is implied by all log-concave distributions and is comfortably satisﬁed
by other distributions commonly used in the search literature.9 By contrast, higher long-run
impatience is in general associated with shorter unemployment spells (the reservation wage
eﬀect dominates). This result is always true for values of δ close enough to one. Extensive
simulations in DV-P show that for plausible parameterizations of the wage distribution and of
the layoﬀ probability the exit rate is decreasing in δ for all values of the yearly discount factor
9See DV-P, Proposition 2.
9greater than 0.8.10 In other words, over the range of values that are considered plausible in
the consumption and ﬁnance literature, the exit rate is decreasing in δ.
For intuition on this result, consider the two separate decisions making up the search process.
The decision on intensity of search eﬀort involves a trade-oﬀ between the present costs of
searching and beneﬁts that will start to materialize in the near future, once an oﬀer is accepted.
This time span is relatively short: in the United States most spells end in less than 30 weeks.
Over this limited time horizon, short-run impatience matters the most. On the other hand,
the reservation wage decision involves a comparison of long-term consequences, once an oﬀer is
received: the worker chooses whether to accept the wage or wait for an even better oﬀer. Since
most employment spells last for more than a year, the worker is making a choice for the long
run. Therefore, the reservation wage is mainly aﬀected by the degree of long-run discounting.
The distinct role played by β and δ in the job search process is important for identiﬁcation
i s s u e s .D e s p i t et h ef a c tt h a tb o t hβ and δ represent the degree of preferences for the present
versus the future, it is possible to identify them separately. The above discussion suggests that,
to a ﬁrst approximation, data on reservation wages alone may be suﬃcient to identify δ, and
data on search intensity may be suﬃcient to identify β.
3. Estimation
I now turn to the structural estimation of the job search model, using data on the duration of
unemployment spells and on re-employment wages, as in the classic works of Wolpin (1987),
and van den Berg (1990). My work is new in that it allows for hyperbolic preferences, and
centers its attention on the discounting parameters. I also attempt to estimate the parameters
of the cost of search function, a feature absent from models with an exogenous oﬀer arrival
rate. As in van den Berg, I introduce non-stationarity by allowing for UI beneﬁts to run out
after a limited amount of time. I estimate the model separately for three groups of workers,
classiﬁed by their wage prior to the unemployment spell. In this way, I am able to control
for observed heterogeneity along one very important dimension. In addition, in the basic
speciﬁcation I will allow variation in parameters by AFQT scores and marital status within
each wage group.11 Finally, I incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in the form of a ﬁnite
mixture distribution for the model parameters. This will help to capture the negative duration
dependence in unemployment spells typically observed in this type of data. In section 4.4 I
10See DV-P, Table 1.
11AFQT and marital status were chosen as the explanatory variables since it appeared that the most signiﬁcant
variation in exit rates and re-employment wages occurred along these lines.
10consider alternative forms in which observed heterogeneity may aﬀect the parameters of the
model.
3.1. The likelihood function
The data consists of observations on the length of unemployment spells in weeks, Ti,o nr e -
employment wages wi, and on a set of individual characteristics Xi for a sample of individuals
i =1 ,2,...,N. Assume for the moment that there are no censored spells and that the re-
employment wage is observed for every individual in the sample. I take the week as the time
unit, and I denote by ht (θ,X i) ≡ st (θ,X i)[1− Fθ (w∗
t (θ,X i))] t h ee x i tr a t ef r o mu n e m p l o y -
ment in week t as a function of the model parameters θ and of individual characteristics Xi.
T h ee x i tr a t ei nw e e kt is simply the product of the probability of receiving an oﬀer in week t,
st (θ,X i), and the probability that this oﬀer exceeds the reservation wage in week t, w∗
t (θ,X i).
The values of st (θ,X i) and w∗
t (θ,X i) are obtained from the solution of the dynamic program-
ming problem (2.3). The likelihood contribution of individual i can be written (omitting the






[1 − hτ (θ)]
















































The ﬁrst term represents the probability that individual i does not exit unemployment in any of
the periods from t =1to Ti−1; the second term represents the probability that the individual
ﬁnds an acceptable oﬀer in period Ti; the last term is the probability density of observing a
re-employment wage wi, conditional on that wage being greater than the reservation wage w∗
Ti.
Note that the likelihood is well-deﬁned only if the actual wage is greater than the reservation
wage for the week in which the worker actually ﬁnds work. This can result in extreme sensitivity
of the estimates to a few outliers. To prevent this possibility, I make the plausible assumption,
as in Wolpin (1987), that wages are in fact measured with error: let ˜ wi be the true wage, and
11wobs










˜ wi ≥ w∗










˜ wi ≥ w∗
Ti (θ)
´ .
With a convenient speciﬁcation of the joint distribution of wobs
i and ˜ wi,t h i st e r mc a nb ee a s i l y
calculated.
Censored observations and missing wage data are easily incorporated in this setting. Let Ci
be a dummy variable indicating whether the observed unemployment spell is complete, and
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˜ wi ≥ w∗










˜ wi ≥ w∗
Ti (θ)
´ .






: in practice, to keep the dimension of the problem manageable, the control vari-
ables will be a set of indicators, so that the hazard rate can be eﬀectively be written as
˜ ht (θ1,θ2i). Finally, one can add unobserved heterogeneity to the model by specifying a mix-
12In my sample there are observations with missing re-employment wage data, even if the unemployment spell
is complete.
12ture distribution with discrete ﬁnite support for the parameter vector θ:
θ =

      









The log-likelihood function for the model with unobserved heterogeneity becomes







3.2. Functional form speciﬁcation
In order to solve the model and to identify its parameters, one needs to specify functional
forms for the cost function and the wage distribution function, and set values for those para-
meters that are not directly estimated. The choice of functional forms is dictated by empirical
plausibility and by computational convenience.
The value of time when unemployed. I model the value of time when unemployed as the






bUI if t ≤ T
0 if t>T
The second component can be thought of as either positive (utility of leisure) or negative
(stigma associated with unemployment). It enters as an unknown parameter in the likelihood
function. Consistent with the UI system in most states, I assume that beneﬁts are received for
T =2 6weeks. The monetary value of unemployment beneﬁts bUI is ﬁxed at the average value
of actual beneﬁts observed in the population of interest.
The wage distribution. I assume that actual wages ˜ wi are drawn from a log-normal distri-
bution with parameters µi and σi. The moments of the log wage distribution are assumed to
depend on observed characteristics Xi. The vector Xi consists of six indicator variables indi-
cating the possible combinations of marital status and three AFQT dummies (high, medium,
13and low). Observed wages wobs
i are equal to actual wages times a multiplicative error term
with a log-normal distribution, so that
logwobs
i =l o g˜ wi + ui,
and 




















This speciﬁcation implies that log wages are measured with a white noise measurement error:
this assumption is plausible if one considers that many of the other characteristics of a job,
pecuniary and not, are not observed in our data. The joint normality of actual log wages and
the error term implies joint normality between actual log wages and observed log wages. Then,
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, and Φ(·) and φ(·) rep-
resent the standard normal cumulative distribution function and probability density function
respectively. The parameters µi, σi, and σu all need to be estimated from the data.
The cost function. A convenient functional form that captures the main features of the cost
function is
ci (s)=kis1+η, η > 0.
The parameter η represents the degree of convexity of the cost function. It is also equal to the
(constant) elasticity of marginal cost of search with respect to eﬀort: the higher the value of
η, the higher the proportional increase in the marginal cost of search for a given percentage
increase in search eﬀort. The parameter ki represents the scale of the cost function: it tells us
how costly it would be to obtain a job with probability one. I allow this parameter to depend
on observed characteristics Xi.
The parameter η is estimated using data from the 1981 wave of the NLSY that provides
detailed information on the search activities of employed and unemployed youth.13 Ic o n s i d e r
13This is the same data used in Holzer (1988).
14an extension of the model described in the text in which workers have already chosen the
optimal probability of receiving an oﬀer s, and must now decide how to optimally allocate
their time between alternative search methods. Assume that there are K diﬀerent methods
that can be used to generate oﬀers. Once the worker has chosen s, he must decide how
intensively to use each method of search. Assume also that the eﬀort exerted in this period
has no bearing on the probability of receiving an oﬀer in any of the latter periods, and that
each search method generates oﬀers from the same wage distribution. These assumptions make
the model eﬀectively static, and allow us to abstract from the issues of time discounting.
The worker’s problem becomes one of optimally choosing intensity of search for each method
so as to minimize search costs, subject to the constraint that the probability of receiving an






s.t. : P (X1,...,X K) ≥ s
Xj ≥ 0,j =1 ,...,K,
where Xj is the amount of hours devoted to search using method j, and cj is the cost of
one hour of search using method j. In the Appendix, I show that an appropriate choice of
functional form for P (X1,X 2,...,X K) yields a closed form solution for the optimal hours of
search for each method, and these in turn generate a cost of search function of the form
˜ c(s)=A(1 − s)
−ε − B, (3.3)
where A,B, and ε are functions of productivity and the cost of each search method. The
productivity of search parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood, using data on whether
each search method resulted in a job oﬀer. Then one can use the ﬁrst order conditions to
back out the cost of search parameters cj, up to a constant of proportionality (details in
Appendix 1). Given α and c, one can evaluate the cost function ˜ c(s) at various levels of search
intensity s. These estimated values are then used to estimate the parameters of the constant
marginal cost elasticity cost function, c(s)=ks1+η, used in the dynamic programming model.
The estimation is performed by running a weighted least squares regression of log ˜ c(s) on
logs, where the weights are proportional to a normal density centered at the estimated mean
probability of receiving a job oﬀer.14 The results of this regression are
14The regression is weighted because the actual cost function ˜ c(s) and the approximate cost function c(s)
can diﬀer substantially at extreme values of s. Therefore we give more weight to those values of s that have
higher density empirically.
15log ˜ c(s)=4 .412 + 1.408logs
(0.003) (0.0011)
The estimated constant marginal cost elasticity η is then equal to the coeﬃcient on log s minus
one. This gives rise to the benchmark value of η =0 .4.
One can then use this value and information on weekly oﬀer arrival probabilities to gauge the
magnitude of k. For example, if one believes that the weekly cost of search is roughly of the
same order of magnitude as the weekly wage, say $250,15 then a weekly oﬀer probability of 0.1
and the estimated value of η imply a value for k of 250/(0.1)1.4 ≈ 6,300. If the weekly oﬀer
probability is instead 0.05, the implied value for k is approximately 16,600.
Unobserved Heterogeneity. I introduce unobserved heterogeneity by assuming that the
population is composed of two unobserved types, in proportions p and 1 − p. Type 1 workers
(in proportion p) have cost of search parameter ki + ∆k and face a wage oﬀer distribution
with mean µi + ∆µ. Type 2 workers have cost of search parameter ki and face a wage oﬀer
distribution with mean µi. The parameter ∆k is restricted to be positive, indicating that type
1 workers can be viewed as low cost of search workers, while type 2 workers are high cost
workers. No restrictions are placed on ∆µ.16
To illustrate behavior of the key variables in the solution, I depict in Figure 1 the dynamic
evolution of the probability of exiting unemployment h(t) and of the expected re-employment
wage E (w|w>w ∗
t).T h e ﬁgure shows the dynamics of these variables for low cost workers,
high cost workers, and for the aggregate of the two types. For both types the exit rate is
monotonically increasing, and the expected re-employment wage is monotonically decreasing.
When we look at the aggregate variables, we see that the introduction of heterogeneity gen-
erates a non-monotonic shape for the hazard function, with a moderate spike at the time of
exhaustion of UI beneﬁts.
15In 1983 dollars.
16It is not necessary to interpret the mixture distribution as actual heterogeneity. One may also view the
sample as composed of homogeneous workers, who own a ﬁxed stock of two types of “search capital” at the
beginning of their unemployment spell: one type of capital generates job oﬀers at low cost but depreciates
rapidly (think of this as search through friends and relatives); the second type of capital generates job oﬀers at
high cost but depreciates more slowly (search through formal channels).
163.3. Identiﬁcation
Using the functional form speciﬁcation described above, there are 27 unknown parameters
that need to be estimated; the two discounting parameters, β and δ;17 the value of time when
unemployed, b0; the parameter vectors of the wage distribution µ and σ (six elements each);
the standard deviation of the measurement error in log wages, σu; the cost of search parameter
vector k (six elements); and the parameters of the heterogeneity distribution, ∆k, ∆µ and p.
In addition, one must specify a value for the marginal cost elasticity η and for the probability
of layoﬀ q. The marginal cost elasticity η i ss e ta t0 . 4 ,f o l l o w i n gt h ec a l c u l a t i o n sd e s c r i b e di n
Section 3.2. I estimate q separately for the three wage groups using employment spells from
the NLSY from 1985 to 1996. This results in q =0 .0111,q=0 .0105, and q =0 .0087 for the
low, medium, and high wage groups respectively.
I give here a heuristic description of the identiﬁcation strategy. Consider ﬁrst an unrestricted
model in which workers choose search eﬀort and reservation wages, possibly not based on any
optimality principle. The parameters of this model, the reservation wage and the probability
of receiving an oﬀer in any period, are identiﬁed using data on reservation wages and duration
data alone. In any period t, the reservation wage w∗
t can be estimated by the minimum
observed wage for those who exit unemployment in that period. Given the assumption of
stationarity from period T onwards, one can estimate the stationary reservation wage as the
minimum of all observed wages among those with unemployment spells longer than T weeks.
The distribution of observed wages for those unemployed longer than T periods, together with
the reservation wage, identiﬁes the parameters of the wage distribution. Having identiﬁed
the parameters of the wage distribution and the reservation wages, it is easy to calculate the
conditional probability of acceptance in each period.18 This, together with the data on the
duration of unemployment spells, helps to identify the level of search eﬀort in every period, st:
in the model, st is simply the probability of receiving a job oﬀer, equal to the ratio between the
exit rate from unemployment and the probability of acceptance. Having identiﬁed st and w∗
t,
identiﬁcation of the other model parameters follows in principle by imposing the restrictions
implied by the dynamic optimization problem.
In practice, however, it may be diﬃcult to separately identify all the model parameters. I
should reiterate, though, that the discounting parameters β and δ can be separately identiﬁed
17T h et i m eu n i tf o rt h em o d e li saw e e k ,b u t ,f o rc o n v e n i ence of interpretation, I choose to present all the
results in terms of the yearly discount factor, which, with slight abuse of notation, is denoted by δ.
18The conditional probability of acceptance is the probability of accepting a wage oﬀer, conditional on having
received one.
17when the other model parameters are known. As discussed in Section 2.3, the two parameters
play fundamentally distinct roles in the job search process: the short-run discount factor β
aﬀects mainly the search eﬀort decision, a decision involving a trade-oﬀ between immediate
costs and beneﬁts that materialize in the near future; on the other hand, the reservation wage
decision involves primarily a trade-oﬀ between payoﬀs to be received at two diﬀerent points in
the more distant future, and therefore is nearly unaﬀected by β (it is aﬀected by β, but only
indirectly through the eﬀect of β on the continuation payoﬀ). This suggests that, to a ﬁrst
approximation, one can use data on reservation wages to identify δ. Then, for a known value
of δ, it is straightforward to identify β using duration data.
To better illustrate this point, I generate some simulated unemployment histories,19 and then
study the behavior of the likelihood function assuming that data is available either on both
duration and re-employment wages, or on duration alone. Figure 2a shows the log-likelihood
and likelihood proﬁl e sa sf u n c t i o n so fβ assuming either complete or incomplete data. 20 It
is apparent that data on wages does not contribute signiﬁcantly to the identiﬁcation of β. On
the other hand, the identiﬁcation problem stands out when we analyze the likelihood proﬁles
as functions of the long-term discount factor δ. When data on wages is not available, the log-
likelihood as a function of δ is essentially ﬂat, and the likelihood is substantially spread out;
incorporating information on accepted wages allows us to identify δ.
4. Results
4.1. Data
My data contains information on the duration of unemployment spells and re-employment
wages for males in the NLSY. I use the Work History ﬁles to construct a week by week
account of every male worker’s labor force status from 1978 to 1996. A worker is deﬁned to
be unemployed if he is out of a job but willing to work. I classify as unemployment spells
all periods of nonemployment in which at least some active search took place. This measure
diﬀers from the conventional deﬁnition in that a worker who does not actively search during
the entire spell can still be classiﬁed as unemployed. The re-employment wage is taken to be
the average weekly wage (in 1983 dollars) in the ﬁrst job after the end of the unemployment
19I generated 5000 simulated unemployment histories according to the model described in Section 2. The true
values of β and δ were 0.4833 and 0.95 respectively. All the other parameter values were set at their maximum
likelihood estimates for the medium wage sample (Table 3).
20The likelihood and log-likelihood are normalized to facilitate comparison between the complete and incom-
plete data functions.
18spell.
I retain only those spells that were reported in 1985 or later by male respondents with no health
problems, who were not part of the military subsample, and were not enrolled in school. This
ensures that my sample of spells includes mainly workers with strong attachment to the labor
force. In addition, since I am interested in estimating a model with time-varying unemployment
beneﬁts, I retain only spells in which Unemployment Insurance was received for at least one
week. In addition, I discard observations where the logarithm of the re-employment wage is
more than three and a half standard deviations below or above the mean, or with missing
data on the wage prior to the unemployment spell. This leaves me with 1797 observations,
representing 1008 diﬀerent individuals. For the purposes of this paper, I assume that diﬀerent
spells by the same individual can be treated as independent spells.
The empirical analysis is performed separately for three groups classiﬁed by their previous
earnings. The low earnings group includes workers in the bottom quartile of the sample
distribution of previous weekly wages; the medium earnings group includes individuals in the
middle two quartiles; the top earnings group includes individuals in the top quartile. Summary
statistics on the duration of unemployment spells, on re-employment wages, and on a set of
demographic characteristics are presented in Table 2.
There are marked diﬀerences between the three groups in all the variables. Workers with higher
previous earnings have shorter unemployment spells and are employed at higher wages at the
end of their spell. Moreover, as we move across the earnings distribution, we ﬁnd workers who
are older, more educated, more likely to be married, and with higher levels of cognitive ability
as measured by the AFQT score. By contrast, the replacement rate falls from about 70% of
the previous wage for low wage workers to about 30% for high wage workers. Overall there is
substantial heterogeneity in the sample.
4.2. Implementation
The theoretical model imposes restrictions on the range of possible parameter values. For
example the long term discount factor δ must be between 0 than 1. Hyperbolic discount-
ing posits that the short-run discount factor β be smaller than unity, but the model does
allow values of β greater than one, provided that β is smaller than 1+η.21 To ensure that












(1 + η)(1− δ (1 − q))
δ (1 + η − β)
1/(1+η)
19the optimization algorithm does not wander oﬀ testing nonsensical values, I apply a logis-
tic transformation to all the model parameters: for any structural parameter θj restricted to
the interval (c1,c 2), Id e ﬁne γj =l o g [ ( θj − c1)/(c2 − θj)]. I then reparameterize the like-
lihood in terms of the γ’s, which are allowed to take on any values on the real line. The

















, and standard errors for θj are calculated using
the delta method. Standard errors for γ are obtained using the outer product gradient method.
The model is estimated using a pre-conditioned conjugate gradient algorithm with numeri-
cal derivatives from the NAG Fortran library. Convergence to the maximum and calculation
of standard errors took approximately 15 minutes on a dual processor 800 MhZ Pentium
computer. To ensure that the algorithm had in fact converged to a global maximum, the op-
timization procedure was repeated with diﬀerent starting values. The results of the structural
estimation are given below.
4.3. Structural parameter estimates
In Table 3 I present parameter estimates and standard errors for the structural parameters in
the three subsamples.
The ﬁrst observation to be made is that the estimate of the hyperbolic discounting parameter
β increases as we move from the low to the high end of the wage distribution. For low and
medium wage workers we ﬁnd a high degree of present bias, whereas for high wage workers the
degree of short run impatience is relatively small. The point estimates for β in the low and
medium wage samples are somewhat lower than those found in the experimental literature,
(Thaler, 1981; Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil, 1989; Kirby, 1997), but not totally implausible,
especially if we take into account that the experimental subjects are likely not representative
of the whole population. Fang and Silverman (2002) estimate a similar model of job search
for women receiving welfare, and they estimate β equal to 0.61, with quite a large standard
error. The ranking of β across the distribution of previousw a g e si sn o ts u r p r i s i n g :w ee x p e c t
workers who are able to delay gratiﬁcation and have relatively little self-control problems to be
rewarded in the labor market. Using a Wald test, the null hypothesis of exponential discounting










The solution is well deﬁned for β < 1+η.
20It is also possible to test the restriction β =1using a likelihood ratio test. The results of
these tests are reported at the bottom of Table 3. In the low and medium wage samples,
the exponential model is soundly rejected, whereas the evidence in the high wage sample is
ambiguous with a p-value of 0.08.
The estimate of the degree of long-run discounting δ lies extremely close to the boundary of the
parameter space, and its conﬁdence interval is essentially uninformative. Interestingly, we ﬁnd
that the value of time when unemployed b0 is substantially negative in all three samples. This
implies that the mere fact of being unemployed bears disutility. This is consistent with the
literature on subjective measures of happiness (Oswald, 1997; Winkelmann and Winkelmann,
1998): these studies ﬁnd that unemployment has a universally negative eﬀect on subjective
measures of well-being, which goes well beyond that predicted by the income drop associated
with joblessness. Moreover, other structural estimates of the job search model also ﬁnd a
similar result: van den Berg (1990) reports that workers “dislike being unemployed ... for non-
pecuniary reasons,”22 and Wolpin(1987) estimates a positive weekly cost of search ranging from
104 to 223 dollars. Note also that the disutility is greater as we move up the wage distribution:
the psychic cost of being unemployed is larger for workers who experience unemployment
(either personally or through acquaintances) relatively rarely.
The high estimated value of δ has implications for the other model parameters: in particu-
lar, agents, being extremely patient in the long run, will reject a large proportion of oﬀered
wages. This is reﬂected in the estimates of µ: the estimated mean of the log wage distribution
lies between 50 and 100 log points below the mean of observed log wages in all population
subgroups, indicating that a sizeable fraction of wages are rejected. Similarly, the estimated
standard deviation of the log wage distribution is larger than the observed standard deviation
in all subsamples. Measurement error accounts for only a small fraction of the total variation
in log wages. Altogether, there is substantial heterogeneity in the parameters of the wage
distribution across population subgroups, for all three samples.
The cost of search parameter vector k follows a general pattern in all three subsamples, with
costs of search being the highest for unmarried workers with low AFQT and the lowest for
married workers with high AFQT. It is conceivable that low-skill workers do indeed face a higher
cost of obtaining a job oﬀer with a given probability. Similarly, the result on marital status can
be explained by the fact that married workers have a broader network of acquaintances that
may facilitate the job search process. It is worth noting that the pattern of the parameters is the
same pattern that appears in the distribution of unemployment duration (which is correlated
22van den Berg (1990), page 270.
21negatively with cognitive ability and marriage): it appears that the cost of search parameter
is governing most of the variation in exit rates across groups.
4.4. Alternative forms of heterogeneity
A natural question that arises is whether the results are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of
the structural model. In particular, the basic speciﬁcation adopts a very simple structure
for the way in which observed and unobserved heterogeneity aﬀect the model parameters. I
now consider three alternative forms of heterogeneity. In Alternative 1, I let the distribution
of the unobserved component have three mass points rather than two. In Alternative 2, I
add race as one of the explanatory variables for the parameters of the cost of search function
and of the wage oﬀer distribution, while maintaining a two-point distribution for unobserved
heterogeneity. The model estimated in Table 3 is nested in these ﬁrst two alternative models,
so that we can perform likelihood ratio tests to assess whether the alternatives signiﬁcantly
improve the ﬁt of the model.
In Alternative 3 I follow a substantially diﬀerent approach. I allow observed covariates to be
correlated with type probabilities: I eliminate the direct dependence of µ and k on Xi,a n d
instead specify that the probability that individual i is of type j is equal to







In practice, I let there be only two types, and Xi is a twelve-element vector representing all
the possible combinations of AFQT scores (low, medium and high), marital status and race.
These alternative models were estimated for the medium wage sample only, and the results are
presented in Table 4.
Alternatives 1 and 2 signiﬁcantly improve the ﬁt of the model compared to Table 3, as can be
seen from the likelihood ratio test statistics and its associated p-values. However, in terms of the
point estimate of β, there is little diﬀerence between the two models and the basic speciﬁcation.
While the standard errors around β are lower in the richer speciﬁcations, the likelihood ratio
test statistic for the null hypothesis of exponential discounting gives somewhat weaker results,
and in fact we cannot always reject the null hypothesis of exponential discounting. The third
alternative, which adopts a substantially diﬀerent framework for incorporating observed and
unobserved heterogeneity, yields a slightly larger point estimate for the short-run discounting
parameter, with a relatively large standard error. To summarize, introducing richer structures
for the eﬀect of observables and unobservables on the model parameters does not substantially
aﬀect our estimate of the degree of present bias, but comes at a cost of a loss in precision.
224.5. Predicted values
It is worthwhile to analyze how the various speciﬁcations compare in terms of predicted values
for the variables of interest. I use the basic speciﬁcation of the model, discussed in Table
3. The results are presented in Table 5. I compare the mean values for duration and re-
employment wages in the sample to those predicted by the model in the three subsamples. 23
Likewise, I present predicted values for the expected weekly acceptance probability, and the
expected weekly cost of search in the ﬁnal week of unemployment. All the models do a fairly
good job of matching the average re-employment wage. The expected unemployment duration
is consistently overestimated, but this was to be expected, given that in the calculation of
predicted unemployment duration we give positive weight to extremely long spells that would
be censored in the actual data.
The predicted values for the unobserved quantities raise some questions. As noted earlier,
the very high degree of long run patience impliest h a tw o r k e r sa r eq u i t es e l e c t i v ei nt h e i rj o b
acceptance strategy. Previous research has estimated the acceptance probability at around 60
percent (Blau and Robins, 1990), substantially higher than my estimate of 14 to 26 percent.
Moreover, the estimated cost of search in the high wage sample, equal to more than one and
a half times the re-employment wage, seems too high. These ﬁndings suggest that it may be
helpful to use outside sources of information to place prior restrictions on functions of the
structural parameters. The use of an informative prior for a well-deﬁned quantity such as the
acceptance probability is easily justiﬁable. This strategy is appealing in that it may become
possible to learn more about parameters that are poorly identiﬁed in the likelihood.
4.6. Dynamics
The expected values in Table 5 hide a rich set of dynamic behavior in the model. Table 6
and Figures 3a-3c show the dynamic evolution of several variables of interest over the course
of an unemployment spell. Dynamics in the model (see Figure 1) are generated by the lim-
ited availability of unemployment insurance, and by the changing composition of the sample
as the unemployment spell progresses: workers with an unobserved low cost of search exit
unemployment much more frequently, so that the pool of workers who are still unemployed
is increasingly dominated by the high cost individuals. These two forces operate in opposite
23The predicted values are the expectations of the relevant variables, evaluated analytically at the maximum
likelihood estimates, and integrated over the distribution of both observed and unobserved types. See Appendix
B for details.
23directions on the exit rate from unemployment. As beneﬁts run out, workers increase the in-
tensity of search and begin to accept a larger fraction of wage oﬀers, so that, for a given worker
type, the exit rate increases in the ﬁrst 26 weeks. On the other hand, the aggregate exit rate
decreases as the sample is increasingly dominated by high cost types with low exit rates. The
expected re-employment wage, by contrast, decreases monotonically: as the time of beneﬁt
exhaustion approaches both types of workers set a lower reservation wage, and, because high
cost workers have lower reservation wages, the aggregate expected re-employment wage also
declines as more and more low-cost workers exit unemployment.
Figures 3a-3c show that in all three samples the model does a good job at ﬁtting the survivor
f u n c t i o n ,e v e nt h o u g hi tc a n n o tc a p t u r et h eh i g hw e e kt ow e e kv a r i a t i o ni ne x i tr a t e sa n d
expected re-employment wages. In the low and medium wage samples the exit rate is initially
ﬂat and begins to rise as week 26 (the time of exhaustion of UI beneﬁts) approaches. In the
high wage sample the exit rate falls monotonically.
The results of Table 6 show that most of the diﬀerence in exit rates between high and low
wage workers can be attributed to diﬀerences in (endogenously determined) oﬀer arrival rates.
In fact, conditional on receiving oﬀers, low-wage workers accept a higher proportion of wages,
but have longer unemployment spells because of low oﬀer probabilities. This ﬁnding is in
accordance with much of the previous literature, which ﬁnds that variation in oﬀer arrival rates
plays a much larger role in explaining unemployment duration than variation in reservation
wages (see Devine and Kiefer, 1991). On the other hand, in the comparison between medium
wage and low wage workers, we see that the former have higher exit rates because of higher
acceptance probabilities.
We see that predicted acceptance probabilities are quite low during the ﬁrst few weeks of the
spell, ranging from 12 to 20 percent. In the low and medium wage samples, the proportion
of acceptable oﬀers rises to 34-50 percent after one year, and to 77 to 90 percent after two
years. This simply reﬂects the fact that after two years the sample is composed almost entirely
of high-cost types who accept nearly any oﬀer. In the high wage sample, the acceptance
probability remains at very low levels even after two years.
The cost of search behaves in a very non-linear fashion: in the low and medium wage samples
it increases in the ﬁrst 26 weeks, and then decreases; in the high wage sample it dips in the ﬁrst
few weeks, then rises up to week 26, and then decreases. This pattern is explained by the fact
that as the time of beneﬁt exhaustion approaches, all worker types search more intensively,
driving up search costs; but this eﬀect is oﬀset by the increasing proportion of high cost types,
who search less intensively and actually end up paying a lower overall cost of search.
245. Policy Evaluation
One of the main advantages of structural estimation is that it allows one to simulate the
eﬀects of diﬀerent policy interventions in a behaviorally consistent manner. In addition, it is
possible evaluate the eﬀects of a given policy on outcomes that are not always observable in
other contexts: for example, by fully specifying the agent’s preferences and assuming that the
agent follows an optimal strategy, we can carry out welfare comparisons between alternative
policies. In our setting, this can be particularly important, because a hyperbolic agent’s
dynamic inconsistency may imply that some policy intervention can raise his or her long-term
welfare. Alternatively, one may wish to assess whether the estimated eﬀect of a given policy
is sensitive to the assumption made about intertemporal preferences.
For a range of diﬀerent policies and diﬀerent outcome variables, I ask two questions:
1. Using the maximum likelihood estimates from Tables 3, and assuming that the worker
has hyperbolic preferences, what is the eﬀect of the policy on the outcome?
2. How is the conclusion altered if one assumes instead that agents have exponential pref-
erences?
To answer this second question, I re-estimate the model parameters under the restriction that
β =1 , a n dt h e ne v a l u a t et h ee ﬀects of the diﬀerent policies. I call these calibrated policy
evaluations.24
Ie v a l u a t et h ee ﬀect of any policy on four outcome variables: a) the expected duration of unem-
ployment; b) the expected re-employment wage; c) the expected level of government payments;
d) the individual’s utility. With hyperbolic preferences, the correct notion of individual utility
is diﬃcult to deﬁne, because of the potential conﬂict between an individual’s diﬀerent selves:
future events are discounted diﬀerently at diﬀerent points in time, and an optimal strategy
from today’s perspective may no longer be optimal in the future. I follow here O’Donoghue and
Rabin (2001), and evaluate the diﬀerent policies using the perspective of the long-run self. The
long-run self’s utility is simply the utility derived from following the strategy chosen by the
hyperbolic agent, discounted exponentially. Because of dynamic inconsistency, this strategy is
not optimal from the long run self’s perspective. The long run criterion can be thought of as
24One could also perform non-calibrated policy evaluations: holding all other parameters ﬁxed, what is the
eﬀect of a given policy for diﬀerent values of β? I omit these calculations beacuse as β changes the benchmark
values for the parameters of interest also vary substantially, making comparisons diﬃcult.
25the utility criterion used by a voter who is not currently unemployed when deciding whether
to implement a change to the UI system.
The ﬁve diﬀerent policies are: a) cutting the level of unemployment beneﬁts; b) a job search
assistance program; c) monitoring the intensity of search eﬀort; d) monitoring the job search
acceptance strategy; e) a re-employment bonus program. I describe the policies below. The
policies are modeled to resemble as closely as possible interventions that are, or have been,
actually implemented. I restrict attention to the medium wage sample.
5.1. Policies
Benchmark. In the benchmark model, the unemployed worker receives Unemployment In-
surance beneﬁts for the ﬁrst 26 weeks of the unemployment spell. The level of beneﬁts for each
population subgroup is taken as the average level of beneﬁts for that group in the medium
wage sample.
Cutting the level of unemployment beneﬁts. This is the policy that is most commonly
analyzed. I model it straightforwardly by cutting the level of unemployment beneﬁts bUI by
20 percent.
Job search assistance program. Many government UI agencies attempt to improve claimants’
re-employment prospects by providing a variety of job search assistance programs (see Meyer,
1995, for a survey). The program may include classroom training, help with writing resumes,
facilitating contact between employers and job seekers, or one-on-one counseling sessions. I
model these types of programs as a 10 percent reduction in search costs faced by the un-
employed for the ﬁrst 26 weeks of the unemployment spell. I assume that the government
bears the burden of this cost reduction dollar for dollar. In terms of the model parameters,
this means that the cost level parameter k faced by the worker falls by 10 percent, and that
government expenditures rise by 0.1k for every week of insured unemployment.
Monitoring search intensity. Some UI systems combine the carrot represented by job search
assistance programs, with the stick represented by a tightening of the eligibility requirements
for receipt of beneﬁts (see Meyer, 1995; Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Deschênes, 1999; van den
Berg, van der Klaauw and van Ours, 2004). This typically involves more frequent contacts
with an employment agency representative to demonstrate active job seeking. I model this
policy by assuming that the government can observe the level of search eﬀort s exerted by the
worker: if this level falls below s =0 .1, the worker is no longer eligible to receive UI beneﬁts.
Monitoring the job acceptance strategy. In many UI systems, in order to be eligible
26for beneﬁts, claimants must be actively looking for work, and must be available to start a job
immediately. However, there might be some period at the beginning of a spell in which the
claimant is allowed to restrict availability to jobs in his or her occupation or on the basis of
pay. The following excerpt is taken from the United Kingdom’s Jobseekers’ Allowance Charter
(www.employmentservice.gov.uk).
“If you are looking for work in your usual occupation, you may be allowed a period
of between one and 13 weeks at the beginning of your claim, ... during which you
are able to restrict your availability to that occupation and your normal rate of
pay. You cannot normally refuse a job on the basis of pay after six months.”
In modeling this policy, I assume that the government can observe the wage w aw o r k e ri s
oﬀered, and that the worker will lose eligibility to beneﬁts if he or she rejects an oﬀer below a
certain threshold wmin. Is e twmin at 0, meaning that any rejected oﬀer will imply the loss of
beneﬁts.
Re-employment bonus. Several US states have experimented with re-employment bonus
programs (Meyer, 1995), modeled on the successful Illinois Re-employment Bonus Experiment
(Woodbury and Spiegelman, 1987). A typical re-employment bonus program could involve
paying a bonus equal to 10 weeks of UI beneﬁts to workers who found a job within 13 weeks,
and then where able to hold that job for 13 more weeks. Translating this policy to our model
is straightforward.
Figures 4a-4e present a graphical depiction of the eﬀects of each policy.
5.2. Results: calibrated policy evaluation
I present the results of the calibrated policy evaluations in Table 7. The ﬁrst four columns
of the Table present the eﬀects of the policies using parameter estimates from the hyperbolic
model. These are simply the parameter estimates from Table 3. The last four columns present
the eﬀects of the policies using parameter estimates from a restricted model, where β is set
equal to 1. For each policy, I report its estimated eﬀect both in levels and in logs. The reported
change in utility can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of each policy: it is the lump
sum amount that the worker would be willing to pay immediately in order to see the policy
implemented (alternatively, it is the lump sum amount by which one would need to compensate
the worker immediately in order to implement the policy).
A 20 percent decrease in the level of UI beneﬁts leads to roughly a one week drop in expected
27d u r a t i o ni nt h eh y p e r b o l i cm o d e l ,a n da1 . 1 4w e e k sd r o pi ne x p e c t e dd u r a t i o ni nt h ee x p o n e n t i a l
model. This corresponds to a 4.36 to 5.13 percentage decrease in duration, or an elasticity of
duration with respect to beneﬁts between 0.22 and 0.26. This estimate falls squarely in the
range of previous ﬁndings in the literature (see Devine and Kiefer, 1991). The eﬀect of the
change in beneﬁts on the expected re-employment wage is negligible: this appears to be true of
all policies, and conﬁrms that search eﬀort is the main channel driving variation in exit rates.
Expected government expenditures fall by more than 20 percent because of agents’ behavioral
response to the policy. The eﬀect of the policy is similar for the hyperbolic and the exponential
model in these dimensions. However, the utility drop for the hyperbolic agent is somewhat
smaller than that for the exponential agent.
The job search assistance program is interesting in that it has a signiﬁcantly larger eﬀect on
outcomes for the exponential agent than for the hyperbolic. The elasticity of expected duration
with respect to search costs is 0.46 for the hyperbolic worker, but 0.65 for the exponential.
Government expenditures rise by an order of magnitude: this seems to imply that a job search
assistance program would always fail a cost-beneﬁt analysis. This stands in contrast to the
empirical ﬁndings on job search assistance programs: Meyer (1995) documents that four of
the ﬁve job search assistance programs he analyzes yield higher beneﬁts than costs to the
government.25 These diﬀerences can be reconciled if one believes that there are returns to
scale in job search costs, so that the equivalent of one dollar in job search assistance to the
individual worker actually costs less than one dollar to the government. Moreover, there might
be other eﬀects that are not taken into account in my simple formulation. For example, if
the program shifts the distribution of potential wage oﬀers, the cost-beneﬁt analysis could be
much more favorable.
The results of monitoring search intensity are striking. For the hyperbolic worker, this policy
reduces expected unemployment duration by nearly eight weeks, and government expenditures
(net of administrative costs) fall by 44 percent. Moreover, these drastic changes have actually a
positive eﬀect on the worker’s utility!26 In contrast, the eﬀect of this policy for the exponential
worker is much smaller, and he would be willing to pay a substantial amount to avoid its
implementation. These results were to be expected: the hyperbolic worker searches less than
25See Meyer (1995), Tables 6A and 6B.
26Here, worker type heterogeneity hides some important features of the policy. In the example, the restriction
that search eﬀort must be greater than 0.1 is binding only for the high cost types, and has no eﬀect on the
low cost types. Moreover the required level of search is low enough so that the high cost types prefer to search
exactly 0.1 rather than lose their beneﬁts. This puts them closer to the desired level of eﬀo r tt h a tw o u l dh a v e
been chosen by a time-consistent agent, so utility rises. A diﬀerent constraint could actually lower utility.
28optimally from the long run self’s perspective: he would be willing to pay for a commitment
device that forces him to search more intensively in the future. The government’s threat to
cut beneﬁts if he does not exert enough search eﬀort acts exactly as this desirable commitment
device. However, the magnitude of the eﬀect is hardly plausible. In fact, Ashenfelter, Ashmore
and Deschênes (1999) ﬁnd no evidence that stricter enforcement and veriﬁcation of work search
behavior results in decreased UI claims and beneﬁts. van den Berg, van der Klaauw and van
Ours (2004) do ﬁnd an eﬀect of punitive sanctions on search eﬀort for welfare recipients, but
not nearly as large as that found here.
Monitoring the job acceptance strategy has a much smaller eﬀect on all the outcome variables,
for both the hyperbolic and the exponential models. Expected duration falls by around half a
week in the hyperbolic model, and is essentially unchanged for the exponential. The expected
re-employment wage decreases by at most 7 dollars. This ﬁnding conﬁrms once more the
relatively diminished importance of the reservation wage channel in determining the length of
unemployment spells.
Finally, the re-employment bonus has quite a sizeable eﬀect on all outcomes. Expected duration
falls by more than two weeks for hyperbolic agents, and by two and a half weeks for exponential
ones. These eﬀects are somewhat higher than the eﬀects found in the re-employment bonus
experiments surveyed by Meyer. This could be due to the fact that the size of the bonus used
here is relatively high compared to the actual bonus paid out in most of the experiments. The
elasticity of duration with respect to the bonus is similar to that found in the Illinois claimant
experiment (which was by far the most successful of the bonus experiments), and higher than
that found in the other experiments.
In a separate analysis, not reported here, I found that most of the diﬀerences between the
predicted eﬀects of policies are due to diﬀerences in the remaining model parameters rather
than in hyperbolic discounting per se. This does not mean that the hyperbolic discounting
model should be dismissed because it does not deliver signiﬁcantly diﬀerent predictions from an
exponential model. Quite the contrary: ignoring hyperbolic discounting leads one to estimate
substantially diﬀerent structural parameters, which in turn could lead one to draw incorrect
conclusions on the eﬀect of a given policy.
6. Conclusion
This paper estimates the structural parameters of a model of job search with hyperbolic dis-
counting and endogenous search eﬀort. The model is estimated using data on unemployment
29spells and accepted wages from the NLSY. The estimation strategy controls for both observed
and unobserved heterogeneity.
The focus of the paper is the estimation of the time discounting parameters. Assuming that the
parameters of the wage distribution, the cost function, and the value of time when unemployed
are known, data on the duration of unemployment spells and accepted wages identify the time
discounting parameters.
The model is estimated separately for three wage groups. In all three subsamples, and in
particular for low and medium wage workers, the short run discounting parameter is smaller
than one: this indicates a considerable amount of present bias. Likelihood ratio tests reject
the exponential model. The model does a relatively good job at ﬁtting observed outcomes
such as the survivor function or the hazard rate, but it predicts an implausibly low conditional
probability of acceptance. Imposing prior restrictions on quantities such as the acceptance
probability or the cost of search may improve the ﬁt of the model and may also help us gain
precision in the estimation of poorly identiﬁed parameters.
The paper also uses the structural parameters to evaluate alternative policy interventions for
the unemployed. The impact of diﬀerent policies varies substantially depending on whether
the model is calibrated with hyperbolic or exponential preferences.
In future work I plan to incorporate explicitly prior information on the structural parame-
ters and on the unobserved outcomes of the job search process. Recent work by Lancaster
(1997) and Koop and Poirier (2001) shows how Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation can be
used to obtain posterior distributions for the parameters of interest in an optimal job search
model. Koop and Poirier also argue that prior correlations between the parameters may aid
in identiﬁcation: intuitively, data information on the identiﬁed parameters “spills over” onto
the unidentiﬁed parameters through the prior correlations. In our context, specifying a prior
distribution on, say, the average probability of acceptance, provides exactly this type of prior
correlation between the model parameters. Specifying prior distributions on the outcome vari-
ables has an additional advantage: it is probably much easier to formulate a sensible prior on
the outcome variables than on some of the structural parameters. This is a promising avenue
to follow if one wishes to improve the precision of the estimates of the discounting parameters.
30A. Appendix A: Estimating the Marginal Cost of Search Elasticity
Model. Consider an extension of the model described in the text in which workers have
already chosen the optimal probability of receiving an oﬀer s, and must now decide how to
optimally allocate their time between alternative search methods. Assume that there are K
diﬀerent methods that can be used to generate oﬀers. Once the worker has chosen s,h em u s t
decide how intensively to use each method of search. Assume also that the eﬀort exerted in this
period has no bearing on the probability of receiving an oﬀer in any of the latter periods, and
that each search method generates oﬀers from the same wage distribution. These assumptions
make the model eﬀectively static, and allow us to abstract from the issues of time discounting
described in the text.
The worker’s problem becomes one of optimally choosing intensity of search for each method
so as to minimize search costs, subject to the constraint that the probability of receiving an






s.t. : P (X1,...,X K) ≥ s
Xj ≥ 0,j =1 ,...,K
This problem is very similar to that of a ﬁrm minimizing costs subject to a technological
constraint, or to the dual problem of a worker who minimizes expenditure subject to a utility




≤ 0, for j =1 ,...,K, with equality when Xj > 0;
P (X1,...,X K) ≥ s.
These conditions give rise to the optimal intensities of search X1 (c1,...,c K,s),...,
XK (c1,...,c K,s), and to the minimized cost function ˜ c(c1,...,cK,s). In what follows I show
how an appropriate choice of functional form can generate a simple tractable form for the cost
function.
Analytical Solution. We make two important assumptions about the function P (·).
1. The probability of receiving an oﬀer using method j is independent of intensity of search
in method j0,j 0 6= j.
312. The probability of receiving an oﬀer using method j, f (Xj), is an increasing and concave
function of intensity of search in method j. Moreover, the probability of receiving an oﬀer
using method j when one does not use the method at all is equal to zero. Therefore,
f0 (·) > 0,f 00 (·) < 0, and f (0) = 0.




[1 − f (Xj)]. (A.1)
This expression tells us that the probability of receiving an oﬀer is equal to one minus the
probability of receiving no oﬀers at all using any of the K methods.
Now let
f (Xj)=1− (1 + Xj)
−αj , αj > 0. (A.2)
It is easy to verify that this functional form satisﬁes all the necessary requirements. Using
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Now, using the fact that s =1−
QK
j=1 [1 − f (Xj)] = 1 −
QK
j=1 (1 + Xj)
−αj , we can solve for
the individual Xj’s:
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 × 1(s ∈ Si)




j=1 1(Xj (s) > 0) = i
o
is the set of all
possibles values such that exactly i methods of search are used; and Ji = {j : Xj (s) > 0, for s ∈ Si}
32is the set of indicators for which search methods are used, when exactly i methods are used.
For large s, when all search methods are used, this function takes the form
˜ c(s)=A(1 − s)
−ε − B. (A.4)
with ε =1 /
P
j αj. The elasticity of the marginal cost of search is equal to s(1 + ε)/(1 − s).
Estimation. We estimate the parameters of the cost function using the 1981 wave of the
NLSY, that provides detailed information on the search activities of employed and unemployed
youth.27 For those who searched for a job in the four weeks prior to the NLSY interview, we
have information on whether search resulted in a job oﬀer for each of eleven diﬀerent methods.28
We also have information on the number of hours searched in the past week. I assume that the
number of hours of search was constant in each of the past four weeks, and that the probability
of receiving a job oﬀer in a given week is independent of search eﬀort in any other week. Let
Xij be the number of hours spent searching by individual i using method j, and let Oij be a
dummy variable indicating whether method j resulted in a job oﬀer for individual i in any of
the past four weeks. The probability that individual i received a job oﬀer using method j in
any of the past four weeks is
1 − (1 − f (Xij))
4 =1− (1 + Xij)
−4αj






















Note that each α can be estimated consistently by maximizing the likelihood separately for
each search method. This simpliﬁes the calculations considerably. Given α, one can back out




(1 + ¯ xK)
(1 + ¯ xj)
27This is the same data used in Holzer (1988).
28These were: 1) checked with the state employment agency; 2) checked with a private employment agency;
3) asked friends and relatives about jobs; 4) placed or answered newspaper ads; 5) took the civil servces test or
applied for a government job; 6) contacted any public organization; 7) contacted a school placement oﬃce; 8)
asked teachers or professors about jobs; 9) checked with a labor union; 10) checked directly with employers; 11)
other methods.
33The estimation is carried out on the subsample of youth who were searching while unemployed,
and did not list being in school as their main activity during the survey week. I focus on the
four most popular search methods (state employment service, friends and relatives, newspaper
ads, direct employer contact), and aggregate the other methods into the “other methods”
category.
The ﬁrst three columns of Appendix Table 1 present the percentage of the sample using each
method, and, conditional on using the method, the average hours spent searching and the
probability of receiving an oﬀer in any of the past four weeks. I also report the implied weekly
probability of receiving an oﬀer. The next two columns report the estimates and standard
errors for the parameters of the probability function, α1,...,α5, and for the cost coeﬃcients
c1,...,c 5.
Given α and c, one can evaluate the cost function ˜ c(s) at various levels of search intensity s.
These estimated values are then used to estimate the parameters of the constant marginal cost
elasticity cost function, c(s)=ks1+η, used in the dynamic programming model. The estima-
tion is performed by running a weighted least squares regression of log ˜ c(s) on logs, where the
weights are proportional to a normal density centered at the estimated mean probability of
receiving a job oﬀer.29 The results of this regression are
log ˜ c(s)=4 .412 + 1.408logs
(0.003) (0.0011)
The estimated constant marginal cost elasticity η is then equal to the coeﬃcient on log s minus
one. This gives rise to the benchmark value of η =0 .4 used in the text.
29The regression is weighted because the actual cost function ˜ c(s) and the approximate cost function c(s)
can diﬀer substantially at extreme values of s. Therefore we give more weight to those values of s that have
higher density empirically.
34B. Appendix B: Calculation of Predicted Values








b et h ee x i tr a t ef o raw o r k e ro ft y p ej (j = HI,LO) in week t of an unem-
ployment spell. The exit rate is the product of the probability of receiving an oﬀer sjt and the







. Let D be the random variable indicating the
length of the unemployment spell. The survivor function at week t is the probability that a
spell lasts t weeks or longer. The survivor function at week t for type j is




with the convention that hj0 =0 . Let φj1 be the proportion of workers of type j in the sample,
and let φjt be the proportion of workers of type j who are still unemployed at time t:
φjt = P (j | D ≥ t)=
P (D ≥ t | j)P (j)
P






T h ea g g r e g a t ee x i tr a t ei nw e e kt is Ht:
Ht = P (D = t | D ≥ t)=
X
j





The aggregate survivor function in week t is Zt:
Zt = P (D ≥ t)=
t−1 Y
s=1
(1 − Hs). (B.3)




tP (D = t)=
∞ X
t=1





Expected Re-employment Wage. Let ˜ wjt be the expected re-employment wage for workers
of type j who exit unemployment in week t. The aggregate expected re-employment wage in
35week t is given by:
˜ Wt = E
³
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where the second to last equality is derived by using (B.1) in both the numerator and the









Average weekly cost of search, long run utility. The predicted values for the expectation
of the average weekly cost of search and of long run utility are derived in analogous manner
to the expected re-employment wage. Let ¯ cjt = t−1 Pt
s=1 c(sjt) be the average weekly cost of
search for a worker of type j who exits unemployment in week t. Let ujt be the expected long
run utility for a worker of type j who exits unemployment at time t. Then, using a similar
line of argument as for the calculation of the expected re-employment wage, we obtain the



























Conditional Probability of Acceptance. The conditional probability of acceptance is cal-
culated as the expected total number of accepted oﬀers divided by the expected total number of
oﬀers. Since eventually all workers exit unemployment, the expected total number of accepted
oﬀers is equal to 1. The expected total number of oﬀers is the sum, over all periods t, of the
probability of receiving an oﬀer conditional on being unemployed at t, times the probability of
being unemployed at t. Let St =
P
j φjtsjt be the aggregate expected probability of receiving
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Table 1: Summary of Theoretical Results 
† 
         
          
   Search Reservation Probability     
Variable Description  Parameter  Effort  Wage  Of Acceptance  Exit rate 
 Short Run Impatience  β  + +/=
1 -/=
2 + 
          
 Long Run Impatience  δ  + +  -  -
3 
 Utility of Leisure  b -  +  -  - 
 Location of wage 
distribution  µ  + +  +  + 
 
 Dispersion of wage  
distribution  σ  + +  ?  ? 
 Probability of layoff  q  - -  +  ? 
          
 Cost of search  k  - -  +  ? 
 
                                                            
† Notes: The entries in the Table represent the partial effects of a change in the parameters on job search outcomes.  
1 The effect of a decrease in β on the reservation wage is negative for sophisticated workers, and null for naive workers. 
2 The effect of a decrease in β on the probability of acceptance is positive for sophisticated workers, and null for naive workers. 
3 Extensive simulations show that the sign of the partial derivative of the exit rate with respect to δ is negative. See text for details.     
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
† 
 
  Low wage  Medium Wage  High Wage 
  
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean.  Std. Dev. 
Duration  24.81 27.04 21.57 24.60 16.47 18.67 
        
Re-employment 
wage 
180.25  89.09  265.90 104.17 462.34 201.55 
        
Log (Re-
employment wage) 
5.10 0.43 5.51 0.41 6.04 0.46 
        
Previous Wage  150.10 37.31 277.27 50.05 532.48  204.98 
        
UI benefits  95.39  42.53 138.52 94.71 167.81 47.70 
        
Replacement rate  0.72 0.65 0.51 0.37 0.34 0.12 
        
Age  28.18 4.13 29.07 3.89 30.49 3.90 
        
Education  11.67 1.83 11.90 1.70 12.61 1.83 
        
Married  0.33 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.57 0.50 
        




450 898 449 
 
                                                            
† Notes: The sample includes all spells of unemployment for males not enrolled in school and not in the military, reported after 1985, 
in which Unemployment Insurance benefits were received for at least one week. 
Source: Author’s calculations from the NLSY.  
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Table 3: Estimated Model Parameters 
† 
         






  Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
Discounting  Parameters       
β  0.4021 (0.1075) 0.4833 (0.1971) 0.8937 (0.1441) 
δ  0.9962  (0.1848) 1.0000* (0.0001)  0.9989  (0.1798) 
        
Value of time when 
unemployed        
b0  -141.61 (61.16) -164.31 (61.43) -308.78  (193.53) 
        
Parameters of the wage offer 
distribution        
µ1 (unmarried, low AFQT)  4.1545 (0.1996) 5.0230 (0.1547) 5.4296 (0.3408) 
µ2 (unmarried, medium AFQT)  4.3613 (0.1789) 5.0993 (0.1230) 5.2297 (0.1331) 
µ3 (unmarried, high AFQT)  4.9503 (0.2341) 4.8658 (0.1425) 4.5543 (0.1785) 
µ4 (married, low AFQT)  4.3954 (0.2187) 5.1694 (0.1192) 5.6692 (0.1956) 
µ5 (married, medium AFQT)  4.2771 (0.1337) 5.2790 (0.1150) 5.4365 (0.1361) 
µ6 (married, high AFQT)  4.1175 (0.2683) 5.0735 (0.0837) 5.3669 (0.1235) 
        
σ1 (unmarried, low AFQT)  0.7196 (0.0723) 0.5614 (0.0585) 0.7444 (0.1659) 
σ2 (unmarried, medium AFQT)  0.5760 (0.0516) 0.4122 (0.0453) 0.5810 (0.0502) 
σ3 (unmarried, high AFQT)  0.2786 (0.2653) 0.4793 (0.0397) 0.7108 (0.0944) 
σ4 (married, low AFQT)  0.5413 (0.0770) 0.3525 (0.0459) 0.5658 (0.0767) 
σ5 (married, medium AFQT)  0.5187 (0.0423) 0.3068 (0.0410) 0.4649 (0.0424) 
σ6 (married, high AFQT)  0.5715 (0.1039) 0.3463 (0.0320) 0.5503 (0.0436) 
        
Standard Deviation of the 
Measurement Error in Log 
Wages 
      
σu  0.1330 (0.0256) 0.2256 (0.0197) 0.0990 (0.0182) 
        
Parameters of the cost of search 
function        
k1 (unmarried, low AFQT)  678  (382)  2,998 (1,818) 9,085 (8,106) 
k2 (unmarried, medium AFQT)  359  (217)  1,174  (797)  1,198  (879) 
k3 (unmarried, high AFQT)  3,362  (3,442)  325  (273)  304  (194) 
k4 (married, low AFQT)  451  (343)  1,002  (780)  8,499  (6,681) 
k5 (married, medium AFQT)  83  (31)  905  (667)  1,216  (873) 
k6 (married, high AFQT)  118  (160)  170  (98)  1,073  (685) 
        
 
                                                            
† Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors were obtained using the outer product gradient method.  
* : Indicates that the estimate is at the border of the parameter space: standard errors should be viewed with caution. 
Source: Author’s calculations from the NLSY.  
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Table 3: Estimated Model Parameters – Continued 
† 
        
  Low Wage Sample  Medium Wage 
Sample 
High Wage Sample 
  Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
Parameters of the 
heterogeneity 
distribution 
      
∆µ  0.5456 (0.1262) 0.0201 (0.1185) 0.2179 (0.1412) 
∆k  12,374 (4,217) 19,114 (7,675) 56,857  (28,021) 
p  0.2962 (0.0505) 0.2276 (0.0330) 0.2974 (0.0341) 
        
        
Number of 
Observations  450 898 449 
        
Log-Likelihood  -4041.5 -8484.8 -4270.2 
        
LR statistic for β=1  17.2268 13.2375  3.0826 
        
p-value 
1  0.00 0.00 0.08 
 
                                                            
† Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors were obtained using the outer product gradient method.  
* : Indicates that the estimate is at the border of the parameter space: standard errors should be viewed with caution. 
Source: Author’s calculations from the NLSY. 
1 Based on a χ
2(1) distribution.  
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Table 4: Alternative Forms of Hetrogeneity 
 









AFQT, marital status, 
race 
 




3 2  2 
 
Link between unobserved 
heterogeneity and control 
variables  
 







j i P '
X ' i e







0.455 0.464  0.697 
      
s.e. of β  (0.142) (0.051)  (0.190) 
     
Log-Likelihood -8478.6  -8453.1  -8452.8 
     
 
LR statistic for the 
restrictions imposed in 
Table 3 
 




0.003 0.000  - 
     
 
LR statistic for β=1 
 




0.23 0.01  0.33  






Table 5: Predicted Outcomes – Averages 
† 
    
LOW WAGE    
  Empirical Predicted 
Duration 24.81  26.06 
Re-employment 
wage  180.25 178.82 
Log (re-employment 






1 -  70.73 
    
    
MEDIUM WAGE    
 Empirical  Predicted 
Duration 21.57  22.43 
Re-employment 
wage  265.90 259.35 
Log (re-employment 






1 -  121.89 
    
    
HIGH WAGE    
 Empirical  Predicted 
Duration 16.47  17.84 
Re-employment 
wage  462.34 455.01 
Log (re-employment 






1 -  760.92 
                                                            
† Notes: Entries in the Table represent the ex-ante expected values of the relevant variables. Source: Author’s calculations from the 
NLSY. 
1 The cost of search is the average weekly cost of search over the unemployment spell. 
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Table 6: Predicted Outcomes: Dynamics 
† 
            
            





















Week 1  1.00  1.00  0.040  0.263  0.152  186.37  63.36 
Week 13  0.60  0.62  0.039  0.226  0.173  183.44  66.75 
Week 26  0.32  0.36  0.047  0.212  0.224  175.74  88.48 
Week 52  0.14  0.12  0.034  0.099  0.344  169.59  80.41 
Week 104  0.03  0.03  0.025  0.033  0.770  161.32  74.48 
            
            
            





















Week 1  1.00  1.00  0.051  0.246  0.207  277.67  111.07 
Week 13  0.56  0.55  0.047  0.202  0.232  270.18  112.72 
Week 26  0.27  0.29  0.055  0.186  0.296  255.87  151.00 
Week 52  0.10  0.09  0.033  0.067  0.493  220.87  124.18 
Week 104  0.03  0.02  0.025  0.028  0.901  188.41  111.18 
              
              
              





















Week 1  1.00  1.00  0.070  0.562  0.125  496.16  732.72 
Week 13  0.47  0.45  0.060  0.434  0.137  470.31  681.07 
Week 26  0.19  0.21  0.054  0.323  0.168  427.92  700.25 
Week 52  0.05  0.06  0.038  0.167  0.225  352.03  543.47 
Week 104  0.01  0.01  0.026  0.069  0.377  272.42  367.55 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
† Source: Author’s calculations.  
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Table 7: Policy Evaluations
† 
Medium Wage Sample 
       
  Unrestricted Model – 
Hyperbolic 
  Restricted Model – Exponential 























                
Benchmark   22.43 259.36  2052  -    22.71  261.25  2024  - 
               
Change in UI 
benefits 
             
In  levels  -0.96  -0.83 -480  -245   -1.14  -1.31 -494  -393 
in logs (×100)  -4.36  -0.32  -26.70 -    -5.13  -0.50  -28.01 - 
               
Job search 
assistance 
             
in levels  -1.02  2.66  10,630  502    -1.43  2.82  25,790  440 
in logs (×100)  -4.65 1.02 182.15  -    -6.52  1.07 262.06  - 
               
Monitoring 
search effort 
             
in levels  -7.69  0.93  -360  485    -1.47  -0.20  -728  -696 
in logs (×100)  -41.96  -0.20  -44.72 -    -6.69  -0.08  -44.72 - 
               
Monitoring 
acceptance 
             
in  levels  -0.61  -4.52 -442  -479   0.02 -7.12 -356  -427 
in logs (×100)  -2.77  -1.76  -24.28 -    0.07 -2.76  -19.36 - 
               
Employment 
bonus 
             
in levels  -2.12  -2.29  556  1092    -2.56  -3.52  543  768 
in logs (×100)  -9.93  -0.89  23.97 -   -11.96  -1.36  23.78 - 
                
                
                
 
                                                            
† Notes: Entries in the Table represent changes (in levels and in logs) in the outcomes as a result of a given policy. The unrestricted 
model parameters are the maximum likelihood estimates in the medium wage sample. The restricted model parameters are the 
maximum likelihood estimates in the medium wage sample subject to the restriction that β=1. Source: Author’s calculations.  
  





Appendix Table 1: Methods of Search 
† 
              
              
 Summary  Statistics 
 Maximum  likelihood 
estimates 
              

























51.66 3.54  13.37  3.52 







70.63 3.61  15.57  4.14 

















62.72 4.77  17.46  4.68 















              
All Methods  100.00  7.17  32.93  9.50    -  - 
 
                                                            
† Notes: Summary statistics based on author’s calculations using the 1981 Job Search questionnaire in the NLSY. Maximum 
likelihood estimates of α and c based on the model described in the Appendix. 
* The cost coefficients are identified only up to a scale factor. The cost coefficient for “Other Methods” is therefore fixed at 1.   






Figure 1: Model Dynamics 
 
  





Figure 2a: Likelihood Profiles as a Function of β  














Figure 3a: Job Search Dynamics, Low Wage Sample 













Figure 3b: Job Search Dynamics, Medium Wage Sample 
  












Figure 3c: Job Search Dynamics, High Wage Sample  
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Figure 4b: Job Search Assistance Program  
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Figure 4d: Monitoring the Wage Acceptance Strategy  
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Figure 4e: Re-employment Bonus 